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In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which 
takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for 
bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined below builds on existing 
national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at 
the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks.  
 
 
1. Background 
 
In the context of the banking union presently being discussed, three major institutional 
projects are planned in addition to a European supervisory regime. First, there is the 
creation of a European legislation on bank restructuring. Second, a recovery and resolution 
authority as well as a fund, i.e. an authority responsible for the planning and implementation 
of bank restructuring, for which the funds needed to recapitalize individual banks, are also 
available. The third major institutional project under the overall banking union program 
involves the creation of a European deposit guarantee scheme. 
 
The reform project on bank restructuring is already well advanced – the Recovery and 
Resolution Directive modeled on the German Restructuring Act is now under discussion at 
the European Parliament in Strasbourg. An ECON Committee vote took place in April 2013, 
and final adoption by the Parliament is expected in September 2013. In contrast, with regard 
to the issue of “European Resolution authority (ERA)” and a "European deposit protection" 
only limited progress has been seen so far.
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 The main reason why the reform of the 
European deposit guarantee scheme has been lagging behind is the explosive nature of this 
topic in the political debate. For many observers, the Europeanization of deposit insurance 
appears to be a direct step towards the mutualization of liability commitments. 
The debate on the introduction of Eurobonds has already made it very clear that joint and 
several liability beyond national borders – be it with regard to the liabilities of individual 
states or the protection of bank depositors – faces significant political opposition. From an 
economic perspective, there are also strong reasons against a comprehensive mutualization 
of liability. Here, in particular, there is the danger that a general assumption of liability by a 
                                                           
1 This document is an (updated) translation of the German Policy Letter No. 16, 2012: 
“Europataugliche Einlagensicherung: Vorschlag für eine dreistufige Einlagensicherung mit begrenzter 
europäischer Haftung“. 
2 At the time of writing this note (late April 2013) the German government has been retreating from 
some of the earlier stances. In particular, the introduction of an ERA is currently seen in the context 
of a treaty change – which itself is not likely to happen anytime soon.  2 
 
European structure would negatively impact the efforts necessary at the national level to 
control and contain banking risks. 
 
However, over and above the strong arguments against a general mutualization of liability at 
the European level, it should not be forgotten that there are also important reasons in 
support of a merger of national deposit guarantee schemes. The limited credibility of a 
national deposit guarantee scheme must be mentioned here – especially if the economies 
concerned are small or cover only a few individual institutions (which is true for many EU 
Member States, but not for Germany). The weak protection offered by small states to their 
depositors creates the risk of a (in)solvency nexus between banks and states. Furthermore, 
due to the increasing number of institutions active in retail banking across Europe – one 
would think of ING DiBa, Santander, HSBC, Unicredit and also of Deutsche Bank here – there 
is a growing risk of crisis-related contagion effects that extend beyond national borders; and 
these must also be taken into account in the area of deposit insurance. 
 
Arising from the above is the demand for a solution to the European liability problem that 
meets two requirements: first, the deposit guarantee scheme should present a credible 
protection of deposits, also in view of the growing interconnections between national 
deposit and credit markets. Second, the mutualization of liability must be designed such that 
moral hazard is minimized. 
 
Below, it will be argued, firstly, that the existing model for a European deposit guarantee 
scheme – the so-called "two-stage model" – only meets the first of these two requirements 
and that, secondly, both requirements can be fulfilled simultaneously under a three-stage 
system. Hence, this three-stage model could be the basis of a European political initiative 
with realization prospects.  
 
 
2. The current two-stage model of a European deposit guarantee scheme 
 
Today, among the general public, the idea prevails that a Europeanization of deposit 
insurance, as addressed under the banking union, inevitably leads to a more or less direct 
mutualization of banking risks. The liability of German savings deposits for present or future 
risks undertaken by banks in other countries was recently the subject of an advertising 
campaign by public sector banks. A simple assumption of the liability for the savings deposits 
of all of Europe's banks by a European fund would indeed have a liability mutualization 
effect – including the above-mentioned negative risk incentives. 
 
For this reason, one-stage European deposit insurance in terms of the replacement of a 
national deposit guarantee scheme by a comprehensive European solution is to be rejected 
just as much as a two-stage solution, whereby European protection is second to the existing 
national protection. This is because, under a two-stage solution, moral hazard is not only 
particularly high, but also related to a lax first stage of national deposit insurance – and is 
thus particularly problematic. Both a one-stage and a two-stage concept for a European 
deposit guarantee scheme rightly meet with great political resistance and probably have 
little prospect of realization. 
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3. An alternative concept: a three-stage deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) with limited 
European reinsurance 
 
The alternative three-stage model presented here includes two essential structural 
innovations: a European reinsurance at the second stage of insurance, and a national 
government insurance for major losses at the third and ultimate stage of the insurance 
scheme. 
 
Stage 1 of the 3-stage DGS consists of the existing national deposit guarantee model in a 
largely unchanged manner. Bank deposits of up to a certain amount – e.g. EUR 20,000 – are 
insured under this scheme. The national fund charges risk-related fees from its member 
banks and accumulates capital in a special fund. The fund is backed by a guarantee of the 
national government.. Furthermore, subsequent to a damage incidence, it can raise 
contributions by way of special charges (pay-as-you-go).  
 
Stage 2 of the 3-stage DGS takes over the excess losses up to a pre-specified maximum 
amount per account, or per account holder.. For example, the liability of this 2
nd
 
 stage 
European deposits fund could be limited to EUR 100,000. Over time, sufficient guarantee 
assets will also be built up in a dedicated reserve fund, financed via risk-related fees and, 
where necessary, special charges. With an insurance covering deposits between EUR 20,000 
and EUR 100,000, this second European stage of the alternative proposal operates similar to 
a disaster reinsurance scheme: damages beyond those assumed by the primary insurance 
will be covered up to a predetermined maximum amount. 
Stage 3 of the alternative concept involves those major damages arising from bank 
insolvencies which exceed the scope of the national primary insurance plus the European 
reinsurance. For these cases, it is foreseen that claims above the coverage provided are, in 
turn, charged to the national treasury. In other words, the first and last stages of the 
alternative proposal will be covered by national funds. The middle stage of the European 
deposit guarantee concept, in contrast, will be covered at the common, European level. 
 
The extent of the European liability should vary in size according to the home state of an 
institution, for example, being a multiple of the national deposit guarantee provided under 
the first stage. If this multiple were to be "four", then the European protection would 
account for a further EUR 80,000 above the EUR 20,000 secured at the national level. 
 
 
4. Other considerations 
 
•  The build-up of an asset base: the two lower stages of the alternative proposal, 
namely the first and the second stages, would each charge their own premium, which 
allows for the build-up of an appropriate asset base. Over time, these fund assets 
would lend credibility to the commitments made under the deposit guarantee 
scheme.  
 
•  For a transitional period, the provisioning of the asset base could be made possible 
by a loan from the ESM. The loan would be paid off gradually whilst the asset base is 
slowly built up via premiums and special charges.  4 
 
 
•  With regard to national deposit guarantee schemes (the first stage of the alternative 
concept), it should be ensured that there is a level playing field. All national 
organizations should feature comparably high premiums and a building up of asset 
volumes in order to ensure that recourse to European reinsurance first follows a 
comparably high own contribution on the part of the national deposit guarantee 
schemes. 
 
•  Especially in a national context, significant changes in existing deposit guarantee 
schemes may be needed, namely when one or more of the above-mentioned 
requirements are not met. This is probably also true for financial groups, an 
organizational structure common among cooperative banks or savings banks in some 
countries, e.g. Germany.  
   
   